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SUBVERTING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
GOVERNMENT DICTATED "SMART GROWTH"
IS UNWISE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
GLINT BOUCKt
"Sprawl." It's an ugly word, conjuring images of some unshaven
guy with a massive beer-gut in a T-shirt spread out over a ratty sofa in
front of a television set droning endless football games.
Given such imagery, "sprawl" is a clever and effective euphemism
to denigrate a phenomenon in which tens of millions of Americans
have affirmatively taken part: suburbanization. In search of a better
life for themselves and their families, many individuals freely choose
to endure longer commutes and greater inconveniences in exchange
for larger, more affordable homes in safe neighborhoods. The debate
among the relative desirability of urban, suburban, and rural lifestyles
has raged forever and probably always shall; but in our free society,
reconciliation of competing preferences in the realm of habitation al-
ways has been entrusted to free individual choice.
Until now. The latest wave of politically correct conventional wis-
dom holds that government planners, rather than individual choices
collectively expressed through the marketplace, should determine
where people live. Obviously such a proposition, starkly stated, would
make most Americans recoil. After all, homeownership is a corner-
stone of the American Dream, and private property rights are its es-
sential foundation.
So, the planning enthusiasts necessarily effect a beneficent facade.
They are not against suburbs; they are against urban sprawl. They are
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not against development; they favor "smart growth."' They condemn
congestion, which everyone hates, and propose modest-sounding ini-
tiatives that promise to solve most of mankind's problems without cost
or inconvenience. The dirty, unstated secret, however, is that the core
of any effective smart-growth agenda is coercion--substituting free in-
dividual choice with government edicts.
Not only is such a program profoundly contrary to core American
values, but like many episodes of government planning, it is certain to
produce perverse consequences. Moreover, the Constitution places
important constraints on coercive government regulation that bestows
benefits upon some while imposing burdens on others in the exercise
of property rights.2 One way or the other, free choice will win out.
We should direct our energies toward expanding rather than contract-
ing individual autonomy, especially in such an important area as
homeownership.
In this Article, I shall first examine the policy issues raised by
smart-growth advocates, and then the constitutional parameters by
which such a debate is constrained.
I. POUCY CONSIDERATIONS
According to the Sierra Club, "sprawl" is "low-density development
beyond the edge of service and employment, which separates where
people live from where they shop, work, recreate, and educate-thus
requiring cars to move between zones."3 Ordinarily, I would not
quibble over the definition of a policy someone else is advocating. I
wonder, however, whether there is a single instance of "sprawl" meet-
ing the Sierra Club's definition. Even the most remote suburban en-
claves provide basic services such as restaurants, parks and recreation,
and certainly schools. Indeed, the only areas that might meet this
definition of "sprawl" would be rural communities-which are one of
I Not surprisingly, the most comprehensive catalogue of euphemisms is provided
by Vice President Al Gore, the most prominent guru of the smart-growth movement,
who variously describes his anti-"sprawl" agenda as "sustainability," "smart growth,"
.metropolitan strategies," "regionalism," "livability," and "community villages." Al
Gore, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Sept. 2, 1998), available in Gore 2000,
Speecles: Building Livable Communities (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http://www.algore2000.
org/speeches/sprawl.html>.
2 For the seminal work setting forth the conceptual framework for constitutional
restraints on property regulation and wealth redistribution, see RICHARD A. EI'STEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTYAND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
3 Sierra Club, What is Sprawl? (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.org/
sprawl/report98/what.hmtl>.
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the lifestyles (along with urban areas) favored by smart-growth advo-
cates.
Moreover, even-the nub of the matter-ihassive traffic congestion,
causing long commutes from home to work4 -is overstated. Increas-
ingly, jobs are located where people live. According to Steven
Hayward of the Pacific Research Institute, "Over the past 25 years,
more than 80 percent of new jobs have been generated in the sub-
urbs."5 In reality, Hayward explains, "Only a tiny fraction of commut-
ing today is from suburb to central city; most commuting is now from
suburb-to-suburb."6 Whether suburb-to-suburb commuting constitutes
movement between "zones" is unclear; what is clear, however, is that if
more people were crowded into central cities, like the smart growth
advocates urge, many of them would have to commute to the suburbs
to follow thejobs.
Taking the definition at face value, what are the concerns suppos-
edly animating smart growth proponents? The Sierra Club contends
that sprawl hurts cities because it "erodes [their] tax base," "destroys
downtown commerce" by attracting shoppers to regional malls, "in-
creases unemployment and concentrates poverty," and "undercuts
property values and investment opportunities."' Sprawl also allegedly
consumes rural farmland and "chews up the countryside rolling over
millions of acres of forest, wetlands, and prairie, fragmenting land-
scapes, disrupting wildlife habitat and altering rivers [,] streams[,] and
watersheds." 9
The hysteria is without foundation. Total urban and suburban
uses of land in the United States constitute only sixty million acres-
only 3.1% of the nation's land:! Approximately one million acres are
urbanized each year; at that pace, "it would take nearly 200
years... [to urbanize] 10 percent of the total land in the Continental
4 See id. (listing six social, environmental, and economic consequences of sprawl,
including traffic problems).
5 Steven Hayward, A Survey of Research on the Issues of Suburban Growth 3 (Feb.
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
6 Id. at 13.
One need only travel the freeways near San Francisco to witness that phenome-
non: traffic is easily as heavy commuting from San Francisco to the Silicon Valley and
to other presumed "sprawl" suburbs, as it is from the suburbs into the city.
s Sierra Club, supra note 3. The Sierra Club's newfound concern for downtown
commerce and property values is striking.
9 Sierra Club, The Costs of Sprawl (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http: //www.sierraclub.
org/sprawi/report98/costs.html>.
10 See Hayward, supra note 5, at 11 (arguing that the facts show that, in reality, very
little land is being converted into urban development).
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U.S."" Moreover, as Hayward points out, "the amount of land dedi-
cated exclusively for parks, wilderness, and wildlife has been growing
twice as fast as urbanized land since the end of World War .,,12
Still, Vice President Al Gore attributes all manner of social dys-
function to sprawl. In a single speech, he blamed sprawl for causing
pollution, crime, congestion, and "road rage;" impeding welfare re-
form; and causing parents to get home "too late to read a bedtime
story."13 Mr. Gore's "livable community," by contrast, "lets you and
your spouse walk through a natural ecosystem as you simply take an
evening stroll down your street. That's spiritually renewing."' 4 In the
smart growth advocates' "dream," as Carl Pope depicts it,
[t] he homes are in cozy neighborhoods, with quiet, intimate streets that
are not always clogged with traffic. Around the comer is a grocery for
milk and bread. The children walk to school on safe sidewalks every
morning, and families swim and fish in nearby lakes. That is the dream
we want to protect in our fight against 
sprawl.
The image is so bucolic one can almost smell apple pie baking in the
oven.
What are the policies necessary to ensure that all Americans oc-
cupy livable neighborhoods with natural ecosystems in which everyone
lives a short walk from a grocery store, a school, and a lake? Accord-
ing to smart growth advocates, they are modest and benign. The Si-
erra Club's two top proposals are "purchasing environmentally sensi-
tive land or farmland to prevent development," and implementing an
"urban growth boundary," which "is an official line that separates an
urban area from its surrounding greenbelt of open lands, including
farms, watersheds and parks."' Vice President Gore has blended
those concepts, proposing to preserve green and open spaces by pro-
viding "$1 billion in federal funds to promote smart growth policies-
leaving all decisions in local and community hands."1
7
Certainly, with only one billion dollars, planners will not be able
to buy a lot of land with government funds. In order to achieve their
" Id.
12 Id.
is Gore, supra note 1.
14 Id.
is Carl Pope, Pro & Con: Finding Common Ground in a Suburban War (visited Aug. 5,
1999) <http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issuel78/iteml355.asp>.
16 Sierra Club, Sprawl Solutions: Smart Growth (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http:
//www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report98/solutions.html>.
17 Gore 2000, Issues & News: Building Livable Communities (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<http://www.algore2000.org/issues/livabe.html>.
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goals, the planners will have to spend a great deal more money to ac-
quire property through voluntary transactions or the power of emi-
nent domain, or they will be forced to regulate private property rights
in ways designed to induce people to comply with the desired model.
Not surprisingly, the coercive model, effectuated through urban
growth boundaries and other regulations, is more politically palatable
than massive tax increases. Here the beneficent facade slips away and
reveals the ugly reality underneath.
Nevertheless, urban growth boundaries are increasingly popular
around the nation. If people vote with their feet by moving to the
suburbs, why would they vote politically to prevent further suburbani-
zation? The answer is simple: once people move to the suburbs, they
become interested in preventing additional traffic congestion or simi-
lar burdens associated with other people who might follow their lead.
So they eagerly roll up the welcome mat. Such is the nature of poli-
tics.
This approach creates inherent unfairness in that growth restric-
tions implicitly benefit people who already have what they want, to the
detriment of those who aspire to the same. Portland, Oregon, which
Hayward describes as "[e]veryone's favorite model for enlightened
growth management these days,"'8 provides an example of this phe-
nomenon. Portland's urban growth boundary is "literally a line in the
land outside of which growth is heavily discouraged or even prohib-
ited."19 The policy is implemented by Metro, a regional planning
authority.20 Metro "has not increased the boundary sufficiently to
meet new demand," enlarging available space by only 2% in 1997 de-
spite an expected 80% increase in population projected by the year
2040.21 In trying to defy demographic trends and individual prefer-
18 Steven Hayward, Testimony to Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
March 17, 1999 (visited Aug. 13, 1999) <http://www.pacificresearch.org/issues/
enviro/shtestimony.html>.
19 Sam Staley, The Price of Urban Growth Controls, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 9,
1998, at G-3.
20 The proliferation of regional authorities and special districts, which are a vital
component of regional smart-growth policies, is itself worrisome. Such entities typi-
caly possess sweeping governmental powers, such as regulation, taxation, and eminent
domain, but are not directly accountable (or in many cases even known at all) to the
electorate. By 1985, more than one of every four local governments was a regional
authority or special district, and their numbers were escalating far more rapidly than
those of other municipal governments. See C.INT BOUCIC, GRASSROOTS TYRANNY: THE
LIMITS OF FEDERALISM 76-79 (1993) (describing the "rabbit-like" growth of local gov-
ernments and public authorities).
21 Staley, supra note 19.
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ences, Portland soon will become a city that is bursting at the seams,
with nowhere to expand. Metro has responded to these dire forecasts
by planning to "shrink the average lot size for single-family homes by
almost a third," thereby squeezing many more people within the same
space.2 It also will restrict retail development to thirty acres, thereby
precluding many popular retailers, such as the smart growth advo-
cates' favorite bogeyman, the dreaded Wal-Mart.2 Predictably, the ar-
tificial diminution of suburban housing development has led to
sharply escalating prices: Staley reports that Portland's housing prices
rose by 63.8% from 1990-1995, much faster than the U.S. median of
18.2% and faster than the price rises experienced by fifty other large
metropolitan areas.24
The urban growth boundary produces numerous perverse effects.
One effect is a system of haves and have-nots: all growth restrictions
lead to higher prices, disproportionately impacting lower-income and
first-time homebuyers. Another is that while open space outside the
boundary is off-limits for development, space inside the city comes in-
creasingly at a premium. As Dr. Staley puts it:
This poses a serious challenge to the ethical foundations of regional
planning. If Metro's plan is fully implemented and boundaries are not
expanded, residents will be forced to live in more crowded cities, smaller
houses, and more congested neighborhoods in order to conform to
Metro's vision of what Portland "ought" to be.
2
5
Indeed, Portland's growth controls are proceeding even at the
expense of the city's economic base. The government has imposed a
one thousand dollar perjob "growth impact fee" on Intel if it adds too
many new employees." As the state director of economic develop-
ment explained, "We aren'tjust interested injobs,jobs,jobs."2 '
Smart growth advocates also complain that sprawl fails to pay for
itself in terms of new services required by residents.28 Carl Pope con-
22 Steven Hayward, Legends of the Sprawk Liberals Have a New Scapegoat for Their Ur-
ban Failures: Suburban Growth, POL'YREV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 26, 81.
23 See id (explaining that Metro "won't permit any retail development larger than
30 acres, because it requires too much parking space and causes too much driving").
24 Staley, supra note 19, at G-3.
25 Id.
26 Steven Hayward, The Scourge of New Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,June 12, 1999, at A15.
27 Id.
28 See Sierra Club, supra note 9 (arguing that "increases in tax revenue are eaten up
by the costs to the community of delivering new services... for people who live far
away from existing infrastructure"). See generally DAVID BOLLIER, How SMART GROWTH
CAN STOP SPRAWL (1998) (listing the numerous constituencies claimed to be disadvan-
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tends, without apparent irony, that sprawl "has been forced on subur-
banites by government programs run amuck."2 Certainly, Pope is
correct about misguided government policies in general."s For exam-
ple, minimum lot sizes and restrictions on multiple uses, often popu-
lar tactics among suburban governments to keep their communities
pristine and exclusive, definitely contribute to "sprawling" suburbs
and to the surfeit of services (like grocery stores and gas stations) in
some areas. Cheerfully, those policies may end up pitting two schools
of big-government politicians against one another.
The claim that current policies subsidize sprawl is difficult to
evaluate, however, because development does not only impose costs
but also generates revenues, such as property taxes, employment, re-
tail sales taxes, and so forth. Moreover, such claims often are used to
justify the imposition of "impact fees," which are politically expedient
because, by definition, they are borne by newcomers. But such fees
add to the cost of housing, again harming people of modest means
who are moving to the suburbs precisely because housing is more af-
fordable.3'
Certainly, local and regional governments should strive for eco-
nomic policy neutrality, 2 so that government does not promote (or
deter) suburban development. Another approach is to stop providing
lavish local government services,'" and to rely more heavily on private
taged by sprawl and proposing a number of anti-sprawl policies).
Pope, supra note 15.
30 See, e.g., BOLICE, supra note 20, at 111-21 (describing the disastrous effects some
government actions and regulations can have for individual owners of private prop-
erty)
See Hayward, supra note 5, at 18-19 (noting that "[i]mpact fees lead to an in-
crease in new housing prices" and that "the costs of fees... is [sic] almost always
passed along to the homebuyer").
32 See SAMuEL R. STALEY, THE SPRAWLING OF AMERICA IN DEFENSE OF THE
D NAMIC CrY 59 (Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No. 251, 1999) (arguing
that neutrality is preferred because "economic development programs and strategies
intended to aid one industry inevitably tilt the balance away from others").
My favorite example of excess is Fairfax County, Virginia, which operates a wa-
terslide park as well as state-of-the-art health club facilities, the latter concentrated in
the newest and most affluent parts of the county. See, e.g., Stephen C. Fehr, In New
Wave of Summer Aquatics, Water Parks Supplant Plain Pools, WASH. POST, July 22, 1996, at
Al (noting that Fairfax County was in the process of replacing its forty-year old pool
with the county's first "water playground"); Donna Niewiaroski, Public orPrivate. Work-
ing Out What s Healthiest for You, WASH. PosT,June 18, 1989, at B11 (reporting that over
the last ten years, "two bond referendums in Fairfax County provided funds for eight
multi-dimensional recreational facilities that were used by 1,861,921 people in 1988"
and that the equipment in these facilities "is keeping in pace with that offered in the
private clubs").
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services in such areas as transportation and garbage collection. Priva-
tization imposes all costs upon the people who use the services, usually
at a lower price than the government.
Beyond subsidization, the other legitimate problem raised by
smart growth proponents is traffic congestion. Even here, however,
the problem is not correctly diagnosed, let alone effectively remedied,
by a smart growth agenda. The belief that sprawl creates congestion is
based on the old "concentric" model of urban areas, wherein people
living outside the city commute in forjobs. Increasingly, asjob growth
proliferates mainly in the suburbs, commuting goes on in myriad di-
rections.- Even if urban areas attracted more economic development,
that simply would shift greater congestion from suburbs to the cities.
Ironically, smart growth advocates typically support increased mass
transit. There may be valid reasons for such efforts, but they do not
square with the professed objectives of the anti-sprawl agenda as mass
transit heavily subsidizes suburbanization. By contrast, roads often pay
for themselves through tolls and other user fees. Moreover, mass
transit typically cannot respond to trends such as suburb-to-suburb
commutes or picking up children at daycare-cars can. If smart
growth advocates actually cared about traffic congestion, they would
support road construction to ease commuting headaches. But they
don't: according to Hayward, Portland "plans to force people out of
their cars and onto public transit by limiting new road-building and
deliberately increasing traffic congestion over the next 40 years. ' O
Finally, smart growth is urged as a means of reinvigorating the
central cities. People flock to the suburbs to escape crime, high taxes,
poor schools, and economic decay. The philosophy of smart growth is
to force people back into the cities in order to cure the problems,
rather than solving the problems as a means of luring people back.
The Sprawl Watch Clearinghouse is remarkably candid about the
income redistribution agenda associated with growth control. As one
example, it asserts,
School reform advocates are not likely to make significant progress in
equalizing funding between the cities and suburbs until they address re-
gional sprawl-the engine for the racial and economic disparities they
decry. Neither busing nor lawsuits have proven successful in assuring
34 SeeHayward, supra note 5, at 12-13 ("[Mlost newjob growth over the last genera-
tion has taken place in the suburbs... [and] most commuting is now from suburb-to-
suburb.").
35 Hayward, supra note 22, at 30-31.
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equal educational opportunity. Regional development planning could.36
A number of policies could be used to foster urban renaissance,
such as school vouchers, economic deregulation, and community-
based delivery of social services.3 7 If successful, those policies will en-
courage suburbanites to consider moving into cities. Forcing people
to live in cities when they prefer to live elsewhere, however, seems
alien to a free society.
At its center, the ideology of smart growth is profoundly paternal-
istic. Its proponents believe they know better than individuals them-
selves about the quality of life and where best to pursue it. They can-
not bring themselves to consider that more than half of all Americans
now live in the suburbs, and they live there because they want to. As
Dr. Staley puts it,
The problem with this anti-suburban view is that these cities-and they
are cities-are not really the bland, faceless, non-communities described
in social studies textbooks. People live here. People choose to live here,
and they choose not to move out. In fact, suburban residents are less
likely to move than their central city counterparts.38
Beyond paternalism, the smart growth advocates indulge the con-
ceit that they are better able to plan efficaciously on a grand scale
than the market, which expresses the collective sum of individual
preferences. As Steven Hayward observes, "many of the problems that
the new urbanists now decry are largely the product of a previous era
of government land-use regulation and intervention." 9 Given the
perverse consequences emanating from early experiments in smart
growth, it seems the new breed of social engineers is no more adept
than the old.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS
Fortunately, no matter how the political process shakes out, the
Constitution places constraints on the power of government to evis-
36 Sprawl Watch Clearinghouse: The Politics of Smart Growth (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
<http://www.sprawlwatch.org/grpolitics.html> (excerpting from BOLLIER, supra note
28, at 39).
37 See, e.g., GLINT BOucy, TRANSFORMATION: THE PROMISE AND POLITICS OF
EMPOWERMENT (1998) (outlining an agenda for empowerment and arguing that we
need to eliminate the barriers that prevent those Americans with the fewest resources
from controlling their destinies).
Sam Staley, Urban Sprawf" A Grassroots Defense (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<httg://v.urbanfutures.org/opedstaey.hmtI>.
Hayward, supra note 22, at 29.
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cerate private property rights.
Proceeding from the desire to secure public goods without paying
for them, local governments in recent years have pursued various
means to pass on the associated costs to property owners. Two
mechanisms are particularly popular: (1) regulating property so that
owners cannot use it in any meaningful sense, and (2) imposing costly
and onerous conditions on owners wishing to develop their property. °
In recent years, the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed both prac-
tices under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
The question in all these cases is this: when government seeks to
fulfill a broad public objective, who should bear the costs--individual
property owners or the general public? If the government can pass off
the costs, it will exhibit little restraint in imposing them. If taxpayers
must foot the costs, however, the government may think twice about
how much it values the particular goal. That is precisely the type of
calculation the Constitution requires.
Three seminal cases have set the boundaries in this area. In Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission, the State conditioned its approval
of construction of a beachfront home on the property owners' allow-
ing unlimited public access to their beach.4' In other words, the State
wished to provide public beach access-but wanted the Nollans to
bear the costs and surrender an important part of their property
rights.
The Court recognized that government may, of course, impose
reasonable police-power conditions on construction permits. Like-
wise, a regulation of property use "does not effect a taking if it 'sub-
stantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y]
the landowner economically viable use of his land.'" But the Court
40 For a revealing compendium of methods to appropriate property rights without
paying for them, see Douglas T. Kendall &James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using
Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801
(1995).
41 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
See id. at 834-37 (discussing the validity of conditions placed on the granting of a
building permit, in the context of the police power, but concluding that there must be
a "nexus" between the police-power objective to be served and the condition imposed).
43 Id. at 834 (alterations in original) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)). Even a government action that temporarily deprives an owner of all economi-
cally viable use creates a requirement of compensation. See First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 305 (1987)
(holding that the invalidation of an ordinance that had denied appellant all use of its
property for a number of years requires a payment of fair value for the use of the
property, in order to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's requirement of "just compensa-
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found that the condition exceeded police power justifications, did not
substantially advance a legitimate government interest, and allowed a
permanent physical occupation of part of the Nollans' property.44
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia condemned the State's action
as "an out-and-out plan of extortion."4 The Court ruled that if the
State wanted beach access, it would have to pay for it.46
In 1992, the Court addressed the case of David Lucas, who had
purchased two beachfront lots in South Carolina with plans of build-
ing houses on them. Two years after Lucas purchased the lots, the
State enacted the Beachfront Management Act, forbidding any con-
struction along the beach ostensibly for environmental reasons.48
Overnight, Lucas's property declined in value from $1.6 million to$0.9
The Supreme Court ruled that Lucas was entitled to proceed with
a takings clalm,. because he had been denied all economically viable
use of the property.51 Given that the property was located in a resi-
dential area, and that the State changed the rules after Lucas pur-
chased the property, the Court declared that the State could justify its
action without compensation only if the use of the property would
constitute a nuisance.52 As the Court explained, the State "may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature
of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not
part of his title to begin with."53 In other words, no property owner
has the right to create a nuisance, so if the government regulates to
tion").
4See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832, 837 (finding that "a 'permanent physical occupation'
has occurred," and holding that "[wlhatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state
interests' in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them").
4 Id. at 837 (citing J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
1981)).
46 See id. at 841-42 (holding that California may use its power of eminent domain to
acquire access to the beach, but California must pay for this access).
47 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-07 (1992).
48 See id. at 1008-09 (explaining that the Act prohibited construction of occupiable
improvements seaward of a certain line).
49 See id. at 1009 (noting "the Act's complete extinguishment of [Lucas's] prop-
erty's value").
See id at 1010-13 (holding that Lucas had a ripe takings claim).
51 See id. at 1020 (acknowledging the trial court's finding that "Lucas's two beach-
front lots [were] rendered valueless").
52 See i& at 1031-32 (stating that "South Carolina must identify background princi-
ples of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found in order to avoid the need to
pay compensation").
Sd. at 1027.
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prevent a nuisance, no compensation is necessary. But if a person
buys property in a residential zone, and the city subsequently decides
it wants to preserve the property as open space, the costs of that pref-
erence must be borne by the city, not the property owner. This hold-
ing should shift the policy calculus away from voracious regulators.
Most recently, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the owners of a hardware
store wanted to expand it.- The city agreed to the expansion, but
only if the owners agreed to provide a greenway and a pedes-
trian/bicycle path.5  The Supreme Court ruled that the city must
demonstrate that a direct and specific "nexus" exists between the
permit conditions and legitimate government interests, and that there
is a "rough proportionality" between the regulatory burden and the
project impact. Specifically, "the city must make some sort of indi-
vidualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."5'7
In this case, the city established its legitimate interests, but failed
to show that the expansion of the hardware store would have an im-
pact on the community to an extent that would justify the permit con-
ditions.e Again, the city's conditions were extortionist. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[o] ne of the princi-
pal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'5 9 If the city
wanted its greenway and pedestrian/bicycle path, the taxpayers, not
the Dolans, would have to foot the bill.
The principles yielded by these cases bode significant ramifica-
tions for urban growth boundaries and other growth-control restric-
tions. To the extent that such policies change the rules of the game
so that property owners are deprived of the preexisting right to de-
velop their property, the restrictions could trigger a claim for com-
pensation akin to Lucas. The owners would have to demonstrate that
512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that the city's dedication of land requirement
would constitute an uncompensated taking of property).
5 See id. at 380 (explaining the dedication of land requirement).
56 See id. at 386-88, 390-91 (explaining the "essential nexus" requirement and stat-
ing that "a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what [the Supreme
Court] hold[s] to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment").
57 Id. at 391.
See id. at 394-96 ("The city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic con-
gestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to
how this may be done.").
59 Id. at 384 (citation omitted).
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the restrictions deprived them of all or mostly all of the value of their
property. This requirement should not present a difficult hurdle be-
cause the objective of the restrictions is to prevent development con-
sistent with the otherwise predictable use of the property. A nuisance
justification would be unavailing to the governments implementing
such policies, as it was in Lucas, because the property owners are using
their property only for ordinary residential or commercial purposes.
Likewise, a development moratorium could trigger compensation ob-
ligations for a temporary taking, as in First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.
Nor are development conditions that might accomplish the same
objectives without depriving the owners of all viable use of their prop-
erty-such as minimum lot sizes or exactions for desired municipal
purposes-likely to escape without scrutiny. The lesson of Nollan and
Dolan is that such conditions must serve a legitimate public objective
(which, of course, is determined on a case-by-case basis) and must be
roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by the development.
Even if growth controls were themselves deemed a legitimate public
objective, as described in the previous part of this Article, many of the
actual regulations conflict with the purposes of these alleged objec-
tives. No one can legitimately object to conditions that force the own-
ers to bear their own costs for roads, sewer lines, schools, and the like.
If the real objective is to curtail development as an end in itself and to
compel specific property owners to carry the weight of those policies,
the courts will strip away the facade of regulating for the public good
and either require the public at large to pay for the desired objectives
or invalidate the conditions.
The rules applied by the Supreme Court in this context make
abundant sense. I surmise that the public only wants "smart growth" if
someone else has to pay for it. Growth control policies inevitably im-
pose substantial costs on property owners who are suddenly unable to
realize their legitimate expectations. If the community wants to con-
trol growth, it should bear the costs of its decision. If the taxpayers
balk, then the government should not pursue its action.
As Justice Kennedy recently observed in United States v. James Dan-
iel Good Real Property, "Individual freedom finds tangible expression in
property rights."61 The message of the recent takings precedents is
60 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that, in normal circumstances, the Due Process
Clause requires the government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before seizing real property).
61 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (holding that, in normal circumstances, the Due Process
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clear: government may not run roughshod over private property
rights. Government "planning" must take into account the constitu-
tional right of Americans to own and enjoy their property.
CONCLUSION
Happily, as is often the case, common sense and the Constitution
cohere behind a common understanding: in a free society, the gov-
ernment is constrained to fulfill legitimate public objectives in a inan-
ner that is duly respectful of precious individual liberties. Sweeping
.smart growth" planning is poorly suited to solving the handful of real
problems it purports to address. Its core objective is not to curb traffic
congestion or to give parents more time with their children, but to tell
people where and how they should live. In the process, smart growth
policies will put home ownership out of reach for many Americans of
modest means.
The bottom line is that if its advocates feel the need to call it
.smart," it probably isn't. If the people do not reject this latest ex-
periment in social engineering, ultimately the courts will.
Clause requires the government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture).
